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The concept of profits is among the most important in economics; it is also 
among the most difficult to deal with, both theoretically and empirically. The 
idea seems simple: “Economic proJit is . . .  the difference between the revenue 
a firm receives and the costs that it incurs.”’ But how should revenue and costs 
be defined and measured? For example, the returns to owner-managers  are 
presumably part profits and part factor payments. Factor payments can be sepa- 
rated out from true profits, if there is evidence of the labor opportunity costs 
of owner-managers. Entirely apposite evidence of this type is, however, rarely 
available. Because estimates of management costs are thus subject to error, so 
are estimates of profits. 
At another level of analysis, profits may be understood either in terms of 
their sources or in terms of  the functions they are supposed to perform. For 
example, the profits of monopolists, oligopolists, and firms in imperfect com- 
petition come from control over the market. For present purposes, models of 
market control are not very helpful. Individual New Bedford whaling firms 
had no significant ability to affect the prices of whale products,  nor was it 
possible for them to differentiate their outputs effectively from the outputs of 
other firms. There were too many firms in the market, dealing with products 
that were quite homogeneous. 
The competitive model is more useful, although it, too, is less than perfectly 
designed for the analysis of the whaling industry. In competition, profits, if 
they are expected to continue, can motivate entrepreneurs to enter an industry, 
and losses can convince firms in the industry to try their luck elsewhere. Thus 
profits and losses signal future changes in the size of the industry: “[Iln long- 
run competitive equilibrium of the industry the firm has zero actual profits. . . . 
The zero actual profits condition is often qualified by adding that this does not 
1. Varian 1978, 1. This is the leading graduate textbook in microeconomic theory. 
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rule out ‘normal’ profits.This not only leaves normal profits indeterminate in 
size but could easily lead to the condition of normal profits being a tautology” 
(Desai  1987,  1014). There  are  also  questions  about  what  service  “normal 
profits” reward and, if none, why they are not competed away. 
Nineteenth-century whaling (like all other industries) did not conform pre- 
cisely to the assumptions of the competitive model. In the standard model there 
is no risk; this is contrary to the situation faced by whaling firms. Whalemen 
could insure out from under some risks, as can any firm. The costs of insurable 
risks-whether  a firm bears  them  itself  or buys  insurance-should  be  ex- 
cluded from profits, and the measures of profits treated in this chapter are net 
of such costs. Other forms of risk cannot be insured against, and their costs 
are normally treated as part of profits. Two types of uninsurable risks may be 
distinguished: those of an unmeasurable form-given  the name uncertainty by 
Frank Knight  ([I9211 1971)-and  those that are measurable but cannot be 
insured against for reasons of moral hazard.* Assuming whaling investors were 
risk-averse, equilibrium profit rates should have settled at a positive  level- 
sufficient to encourage the bearing of  uninsurable risks.  One might think of 
these returns as normal. The fact that normal proJits are positive in the real 
world of uninsurable risks-and  that their level is unpredictable in a world of 
uncertainty-makes  the empirical identification of equilibrium difficult, to say 
the least. 
There is a second respect in which the historical whaling industry deviated 
from the standard neoclassical competitive industry. The neoclassical model 
assumes that all participants in the market have the same information. In fact, 
there were informational asymmetries in whaling. Agents tried to gain advan- 
tages over their competitors by restricting access to knowledge of the routes 
and timing of  whale migrations (see chapter  10). They used voyage journals 
and other sources to construct notebooks of such data and passed them on to 
the captains who sailed for them. Each captain was, of course, sworn to se- 
crecy. There is some question as to how  long the captain felt bound  by  his 
oath, given the relatively transitory nature of the captain-agent relationship. A 
captain who had sailed for the Howlands and then transferred his services to 
the Wings was unlikely to regard his promise of secrecy to the Howlands very 
seriously, particularly  since such loyalty could prove personally costly. None- 
2. To  Knight, and for the purposes of this chapter, a risky event has an unknown outcome, but 
the probability distribution of the possible outcomes is known. An uncerkzin event has an unknown 
outcome, and the probability distribution of the potential outcomes is unknown. In principle, since 
it would be possible to hold a portfolio of risky events and thus guarantee an “average” return, 
insurance is possible. With no information about the distribution of possible outcomes, no portfo- 
lio of  uncertain events can guarantee an “average” return. Moral hazards, moreover, may make 
insurance of some risks either impossible or prohibitively expensive. It is impossible, for example, 
to insure out from under business risk, since the risks are not independent of the actions of  the 
insuree. It is difficult to understand how the owners of the professional baseball teams in the major 
leagues were able to buy “antistrike” insurance in  1981, since the very existence of the insurance 
increased their willingness to accept a strike. It should be noted that the strike was settled as soon 
as the insurance expired, and no one has since been willing to provide such insurance. 425  Profits 
theless, it may well be that good information, carefully analyzed, made some 
agents more successful, in the long run, than others. More generally, some 
agents were simply better at the job than others. It is unlikely that all of  the 
rents due such agents were taken out in the form of  agents’ fees; fee rates 
seem to have been standardized. These rents may have been partly incorporated 
in profits. 
All these notions are essentially static. Profits can also be viewed in a dy- 
namic context-as  payments to entrepreneurs to compensate them for success- 
fully  undertaking  innovative activities.  In the words of  Joseph  Schumpeter 
([1934] 1961, 128-29),  “Entrepreneurial profit is a surplus over costs. From 
the standpoint of  the entrepreneur, it is the difference between receipts and 
outlay in a business, as we have already been told by a long line of economists.” 
In a static world in equilibrium, receipts and outlays are equal; in a dynamic 
economy characterized  by  technical  and institutional  innovation, “since the 
new combinations which are carried out if there is ‘development’ are necessar- 
ily more advantageous than the old, total receipts must in this case be greater 
than total costs.” To  Schumpeter, these positive net receipts “will fall to those 
individuals  whose  achievement  is  to  introduce  the  looms,  whether  they 
produce and use them, or whether they only produce or only use them. . . . 
They have ‘carried out new combinations.’ They are entrepreneurs. And their 
profit, the  surplus, to  which no liability  corresponds, is an  entrepreneurial 
profit” (132). 
For any single innovation, Schumpeterian profits are relatively short-lived. 
They will last only until the herdlike movement of  copycat innovators com- 
petes them away-a  process described by the standard neoclassical model. Of 
course, as Schumpeter quickly notes, given asymmetric information, it may 
take the herd a long time to catch up. Furthermore, in a dynamic world with 
changing technical and institutional menus, an innovating entrepreneur may be 
able continually to stay one step ahead of the competition. 
The profits earned in nineteenth-century whaling were composed of all four 
types of profit described above: payments for bearing uninsurable risks, rents 
on knowledge and managerial skill, disequilibrium profits (for example, profits 
arising out of a sudden increase in demand), and returns to innovation. Unfor- 
tunately, there is no entirely reliable way to separate the four. (The last two are 
particularly difficult to distinguish.) Nonetheless, the theoretical constructs can 
help in the analysis of change in the industry. If  disequilibrium profits were 
important, it should be possible to identify that fact from the relationships be- 
tween profit levels and the expansion or contraction of the industry. If rents on 
knowledge and skill were large, and if some firms were particularly innovative, 
then long-term profit rates should have varied among firms, and the innovative 
firms and those with special knowledge and skills should be identifiable. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we canvass the opinions of contem- 
poraries and historians  of  the industry  with  respect to the general level of 
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book. We discuss the methods of estimation, the average level of the profit rate, 
changes in the profit rate across time, factors influencing the profit rate, and 
the profit experiences of the leading whaling firms. Finally, we compare the 
average profit rate of the whaling industry to profit rates of other leading indus- 
tries of the day. 
The preceding paragraphs suggest that the concept of profit is difficult to 
operationalize. Attempts  to assess profits have left both  contemporaries and 
generations of  historians divided  and puzzled.  Given the usual  tone of  his 
work, it is not surprising that Samuel Eliot Morison is the most glowing in his 
reports of  the earnings of businessmen whose business was whaling. In The 
Maritime History of Massachusetts (1961,319) he writes: “It was a golden age 
for owners. The ship Lagoda, belonging to Jonathan Bourne and others, netted 
them an average of ninety-eight per cent profit for each of  the six voyages she 
made between  1841 and  1860. Several simple Quaker families of  1815 had 
become millionaires by  1840.” He adds in a footnote, “On her next voyages, 
during the Civil War,  the Lagoda netted  her owners 219 and 363 per cent 
profit.” Morison’s estimates-as  we11 as the rest of the estimates discussed in 
this section-almost  surely fail to take into account some costs (such as the 
cost of capital and the cost of management), and therefore overstate profits and 
profit rates. Nonetheless, the voyages he describes were highly profitable ven- 
tures. 
Lewis Holmes (1  857, 145) concluded that whaling was about as tempting 
to the investor as any other alternative. Alexander Starbuck (1878, 145), sum- 
marizing his research on the industry through the mid-1 870s, reported: 
While some vessels on their voyages have made but poor returns, even bring- 
ing, in numerous cases, positive and at times damaging loss to their owners, 
others have done extraordinarily well, and brought in fortunes to those in- 
vesting  in  them. The ups and  downs  of  the business  made it alternately 
profitable and, if not positively losing, at least hazardous. This was the fact 
when no unusual accident occurred, but in case of a disaster it changed the 
beam of the balance from the speculative to the unmistakably negative side 
of  the account. 
Starbuck’s account does not differ significantly from that of J. T. Brown (1887, 
293), who, writing for a census volume a decade later, reported, “The profits 
of the whalemen have for many years been uncertain.” 
Morison’s figures for the Lqoda were drawn from the reports of Benjamin 
Baker, who, as a long-time employee of the vessel’s owners, had access to their 
confidential accounts. The accounts indicate that profits were substantial, but 
perhaps not as substantial as Morison suggests. Baker’s figures for the nine 
voyages between 9 October 1841 and 5 June 1873 are 30, 121, 67, 177, 100, 
97, 364, 219, and 115 percent; but those are voyage, not annual, profit rates.3 
Adjusting for time at sea produces a substantially different, although still quite 
rosy, picture: annual rates of 15,47,24, 63, 39, 25, 100, 57, and 24 percent, or 
3. The full series is reported in Hohman 1928, 282. 427  Profits 
a time-weighted average of 45 percent. If the Lagoda was used only for whal- 
ing during the period covered by the nine voyages, correcting for time in port 
reduces the average profit rate to 41 percent for the period between 9 October 
1841 and 5 June  1873. Moreover, the next three voyages yielded a loss of 
$14,460, a gain of only $6,414, and a loss of $10,254. 
In 1859 DeBowS Review (26 May, 590) reported that the annual profits of 
the 661 whaling vessels that sailed from the United States averaged 46 per- 
That calculation is a peculiar one. DeBow S  profit rate is the ratio of  the 
value of  oil returned to the sum of estimates of  initial investment, interest on 
initial investment, depreciation, insurance, supplies purchased while at sea, 
and wages. If  the figures are reorganized to conform more closely to a defini- 
tion of accounting profits, the average figure is a still substantial 25.6 per~ent.~ 
Similarly, Starbuck (1878, 148) reports that 154 vessels, valued with outfits at 
$4,650,000, hunted in the Arctic in 1849 and that “the value of  that season’s 
catchings was $3,419,622.” If  those figures are adjusted to reflect costs, in line 
with the DeBowS data for a decade later, the implied annual profit rate was 
26.2 percent.6 
There are also numerous reports of particularly successful voyages. Starbuck 
(1878, 148), for example, notes that in 1853 the Fairhaven bark Favorite re- 
turned from a three-year voyage with a catch worth $116,000; the ship Shef 
jield, out four years, returned with a catch worth $124,000; and the ship Mon- 
treal brought back  a catch worth  $136,023.19 after a voyage of  thirty-two 
months and fifteen days. About the Montreal’s catch Dias writes, “[Olne of the 
greatest on record” (“Catalogue of New Bedford Whaling Ships,” 155). 
If these were the only reports of contemporaries and historians, one might 
conclude with Morison that whaling owners and agents were well rewarded 
for their effort, but not all paint such a rosy picture. In 1846, for example, 
Charles Enderby, a member of Britain’s most famous whaling family and head 
of Britain’s largest whaling firm, estimated that the average annual rate of re- 
turn for both the American and the British fleets amounted to about 6.5 percent 
in right whaling and 1.3 percent in sperm   ha ling.^ 
In  the same vein  Starbuck (1878, 149) estimates that, of  the eighty-one 
4. It is not clear to what year these figures refer, but they are annual, not voyage, rates. Since in 
no year does Starbuck report more than 254 vessels returning to the United States (that year was 
1854),  the figures most likely refer to the entire number of vessels at sea. 
5. The new measure is the ratio of revenues less costs to initial investment. That is, value of the 
annual  amount  of  oil taken  ($12,013,805),  less the  sum of  interest  on  the  initial  investment 
($991,500),  depreciation  ($1,600,000),  insurance  ($413,125).  fresh  supplies  ($793,000).  and 
wages ($4,013,601). divided by the initial investment ($16,525,000). 
6. The price level in 1849 was 0.863 of the level in 1859. The costs of seamen’s advances and 
fresh supplies have been adjusted to reflect that difference. Total revenue ($3,419,622), less the 
sum  of  interest  ($284,702),  depreciation  ($474,503).  insurance  ($1  18,626),  fresh  supplies 
($159,482), and wages ($1,139,863), was divided by  the initial investment (the sum of  vessels 
and outfits, valued at $4,650,000, and seamen’s advances of  $95,025) in order to calculate the 
profit rate. 
7. Charles Enderby, Proposal for Re-establishing the British Southern Whale Fishery, cited in 
Hohman 1926, 667. These are pure profit rates, exclusive of interest. Hohman’s calculations are 
not quite correct; the rate for the right-whale fishery, as judged by Enderby, is 6.3 percent. 428  Chapter 11 
whalers arriving in  1837, “53 made paying voyages, 8 made saving ones,  11 
lost money, and 9 involved their owners in severe losses . . . . Of the 68 whalers 
expected to arrive in New Bedford and Fairhaven in 1858, 44 were calculated 
as making losing voyages, and the same proportion would apply to other ports. 
The estimated loss to owners during this year was at least $1,000,000.” 
Reporting on business during 1869, the WSL  (1 February 1870) noted, “Of 
the 102 whalers that have arrived during the year, only about one-quarter may 
be said to have made profitable returns, even those, at present prices, would 
barely have saved their owners from a loss.” Three years  later (4 February 
1873  j, the paper reported, “The continued purpose to sell whalers after so great 
a depletion in little more than a year, shows the judgment of those who have 
long and successfully been engaged in the business, viz: that it has become too 
hazardous, and its results too uncertain to continue it, when capital is promised 
a safer employment, and surer rewards in enterprises on the land, and in our 
own city, where the products of two large Cotton Mills equal very nearly the 
aggregate value of the imports of the fishery yearly.” Nor did business improve 
in 1873. The paper (27 January 1874) lamented: 
A proposition  for the sale of  a whaler is more tempting than a proposal to 
fit one. Of the 19 whalers in the port of New Bedford, January lst, 1873,4 
were sold, 5 fitted for whaling, and 10 still remain in port; of the 7 at New 
London,  January  lst,  1873,  1 has  been  sold and broken up,  and the  re- 
maining 6 are still for sale. Of the 11 whalers now in this port that arrived 
in 1873, 6 are for sale; and of the 21 whalers now wintering here, not over 
7 are likely to be fitted. Of 40 whalers to arrive in 1874, probably about 30 
will be sent to sea again. 
Counterbalancing the occasional reports of large catches were the reports of 
economically disastrous ones. Ignoring vessels that returned clean or not at all, 
there were still those that can be called catastrophic, at least from the point of 
view of seamen, agents, and owners. 
The brig Emeline, of New Bedford, Captain Wood, sailed from port on the 
11th of July, 1841. The captain was killed by a whale in July, 1842, and in 
September, 1843, the brig returned, bringing home only 10 barrels of oil as 
the result of  a 26 months’ cruise. The Benjamin Rush of Warren sailed in 
October, 1852, for the Pacific Ocean. On the coast of Japan the captain and 
his boat’s crew were lost by  a whale. This, combined with the extremely 
poor success that had attended the vessel, had so discouraging an effect upon 
the crew that it was considered useless to prolong the voyage, and she re- 
turned to port under charge of the cooper in  1853, having obtained but 50 
barrels of sperm-oil and 40 of  whale. On her voyage she had circumnavi- 
gated the globe. (Starbuck 1878, 149) 
The best summary of the literature can be found in Elmo Hohman’s classic 
study of the American whaleman (1928, 284). After noting the disastrous sea- 
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of the Confederate cruisers Shenandoah and Alabama, and “the lists of vessels 
which were wrecked or reported missing with all hands,” he concludes that 
“[tlhe financial results of American whaling . . . covered the whole range be- 
tween ruinous losses and magnificent profits. But, though the available figures 
do not warrant precise and conclusive assertion, it is evident that the cases at 
each extreme offset each other so effectually that the long-run, normal rate of 
profit for the industry as a whole was an essentially modest one.” 
Hohman’s judgment was made after examining reports of many voyages, but 
he never systematically computed the average profit rate. The data collected 
for this book make such a computation possible. The data also permit good 
estimates to be made of annual profit rates, profit rates earned hunting each of 
the main grounds, the earnings of individual agents, and, of course, the earn- 
ings realized from individual voyages. With these data the propositions ap- 
pearing in the literature-such  as Hohman’s  assertions concerning long-run 
profit-can  be tested. The pattern of changes in profit rates emerging as time 
passed can also be recovered, and the degrees of  success and failure of  the 
leading whaling firms can be established. Some notion of the scale of average 
returns from bearing uninsurable risk, from the exploitation of special informa- 
tion, and from innovative activities can be obtained. Finally, the data permit 
the comparison of whaling profit rates with those of other activities of the day. 
Our calculation of profits for a voyage began with an estimate of  the  real 
value of  its catch (see chapter 8). The real value consists of  the outputs of 
sperm oil, whale oil, and whalebone, multiplied by the average prices of these 
products in the year the vessel returned to New Bedford, divided by a general 
price index.*  The following costs (expressed in real terms, i.e., divided by the 
same general price index) were subtracted from these returns: (1) the cost of 
subsistence of  the crew, (2) the share of  output earned by  the crew, (3) the 
value of  vessel outfits (sails, rigging, whalecraft, etc.) consumed during the 
voyage, (4) depreciation on the hull and masts, (5) imputed interest on invest- 
ments in the vessel, in the outfits, in advances to seamen, and in articles of 
subsistence, (6)  the agent’s fees, and (7) the cost of insurable risk-the  risk of 
the loss of the vessel. No adjustments were made for the normal business risks 
associated with the search for whales and with the changing state of the prod- 
ucts markets-uninsurable  risks. 
The profits computed in the manner described above would measure the 
return to the bearing of  Knightian risk, the rents to special knowledge and 
managerial skills, disequilibrium profits, and the rewards of  Schumpeterian 
innovative behavior, were the lists of returns and costs complete. They are not 
quite complete. For the fleet as a whole, the procedure ignores incidental in- 
come (money earned through the sale of trade goods, for example), and it ig- 
8.  All calculations were made in real values, although, since one price index series was used to 
deflate all series, the ultimate results-profit  rates-would  have been the same, had all calcula- 
tions been made in nominal values. The deflator employed is the Warren and Pearson “All Com- 
modities” wholesale price index (U.S.  Department of  Commerce 1975, series E-52). “Whale-ships at New Bedford wharves; ship hove down for repairs; oil-casks,’’ in The 
Fisheries and  Fishery industries  of the  United States,  compiled  by  George  Brown 
Goode and published by the U.S.  Commission of Fish and Fisheries in 1887. 
Opposite: Abandoning the barks George, Gay Head, and Concordia in the ice off Point 
Belcher, 14 September 1871-a  wood engraving from a sketch by Captain Kelley of 
the Gayhead. In the early fall of  1871, virtually the entire Western Arctic whaling 
fleet-thirty-two  vessels, of which twenty-one were from New Bedford-were  trapped 
in the ice. On  14 September the decision was made to abandon them, and the 1,219 
officers and men began their trek south. The vessels had aboard 13,665 barrels of whale 
oil, 965 barrels of sperm oil, and 100,000 pounds of baleen. Vessels and cargoes were 
worth together about $1.5 million, all of  it lost. George and Matthew Howland lost 
three vessels, about one-third of their fleet, none insured (Allen 1973, 248-49). 
Engraving reproduced courtesy of the Old Dartmouth Historical Society-New Bed- 
ford Whaling Museum. Map by  Philip Page. 432  Chapter 11 
nores some minor costs (offloading the vessel, watchmen’s fees, etc.). These 
are minor omissions, and should not markedly affect either the level of or the 
trend in the average rate. In some instances, however, the estimate for an indi- 
vidual voyage may be substantially wrong. Some vessels earned freight income 
by carrying home the output of  more successful vessels. The estimates in this 
chapter take no account of these transactions, tending therefore to understate 
the income of unsuccessful voyages and to overstate the income of  successful 
voyages9 
A lack of  voyage-specific information about some other elements further 
diminishes the reliability of the individual voyage estimates, but not necessar- 
ily the average industry figures. (1) The prices of outputs are averages for the 
year in which the vessel returned to New  Bedford, not the prices at which 
outputs were actually sold. (See appendix 9A; the problem may not be seri- 
ous.) (2) The estimates rest on the assumptions that the real cost of subsistence 
per man per month was the same from voyage to voyage and vessel to vessel, 
that the real outfitting costs per ton per month at sea were unchanging, and that 
agent fee rates were constant across agents and years. These assumptions also 
figure in the estimates of imputed interest on investment. (3) For most of  the 
voyages beginning in the years 1840-58 and 1866 (well over one-third of those 
analyzed in this chapter), the data contain ex ante lays (see chapter 5).  These 
data were used to establish the level and movement over time of the aggregate 
lay shares, and these values were interpolated and extrapolated to all the years 
in the data set. We assumed that lay shares were the same for all vessels leaving 
in the same year.  lo It seems improbable that these decisions cause major errors. 
A separate data set for the years 1840-58  and 1866, incorporating true lays, 
was assembled to test the basic data set. The results are encouraging.’l 
Depreciation posed special problems. The best way  to begin the treatment 
9. Freight costs and freight earnings cancel out in the aggregate, except insofar as merchantmen 
or whalers from ports other than New Bedford were involved. They were involved, but most of 
the freight transactions probably took place within the New Bedford whaling fleet. 
10. Lays differed substantially from ground to ground, but lay shares did not. Specifically, lays 
were shorter in the Atlantic, but crews were also smaller. As a result, lay shares differed little. See 
chapter 5. 
11. The two sets of  profit-rate estimates (excluding capital gains) were computed across the 
same sets of voyages. 
Investment in Vessel Measured in 
Net Reproduction Cost  Gross Reproduction Cost 
Estimated lays  14.82% 
True lays  14.82 
7.03% 
7.04 
As a second test we computed the real value of  output per ton-month minus the real value of 
lays, averaging across the experience of individual agents, and following the two techniques. The 
rank correlation between the two sets of  estimates was ,9935. 
The “true”  lays  were negotiated before  the voyage  took  place.  Since the crew  list usually 
changed during the voyage, the aggregate ex ante lay surely differed from the aggregate ex post 
lay on most voyages. The ex post figures are the ones required for profit calculations, of course, 
but few such records are available. The ex ante data represent the best estimates of ex post results. 433  Profits 
of these problems is to consider the investment value of a vessel about to set 
out on a whaling voyage. The investment in such a vessel should be taken to 
be its opportunity cost (that is, its market price). If the vessel was newly built 
when it sailed, then its value could be inferred from prices in the new-vessel 
market. Specifically, for present purposes the vessel could be valued in terms 
of the prices in table 6.10. (In fact, the figures in the third column, extrapolated 
to the earlier years on the data in the first column, were used.) But suppose the 
vessel was not new? There are some data on old-vessel prices, but not enough 
to meet our requirements. 
A second approach would be to approximate the market price of  an old 
vessel by  the depreciated new price. This point needs emphasis. Depreciated 
new price does not mean depreciated original cost or book value-figures  un- 
likely to approximate the true market value of the vessel. Rather, the relevant 
concept is net  (depreciated) reproduction cost, a  concept that  closely ap- 
proaches market value. That is, we decided to value old vessels embarking on 
whaling voyages in the going prices of new vessels, depreciated to take into 
account the effects of age on value. 
The abundant data for the New Bedford whaling fleet made computing the 
life expectancy of whaling vessels-and  thus what would appear to be appro- 
priate depreciation rates-an  easy task. (Straight-line depreciation was em- 
ployed.) The figures used to establish life expectancy refer only to vessels that 
were  withdrawn  from  service by  condemnation or  because  their  owners 
thought they were no longer fit for service. Vessels that sank, for example, did 
not figure in the calculation of life expectancy. (The costs associated with lost 
vessels were taken into account in the estimates of insurance costs.) 
The estimates of  net reproduction cost may,  however, understate the true 
average market value of  a whaler when it sailed, because whalers were com- 
pletely refitted at the beginning of each voyage. Although refitting activities 
concentrated on sails and rigging, rather than hull and masts-the  relevant 
entities in this context-masts  were sometimes replaced, and hulls were thor- 
oughly worked over and frequently recoppered. That is, investment expendi- 
tures were made to offset some of the effects of age. Consequently, depreciated 
reproduction costs probably understate the average values of whalers.I2 
No satisfactory way to handle this problem was found. Therefore two invest- 
ment variants were calculated: the first measures the value of the hull and masts 
at net reproduction cost (depreciated new  price value), the second, at gross 
reproduction cost. That is, the second variant values the hull and masts at new 
prices, without any allowance for depreciation, assuming that old vessels were 
12. Bear in mind that the proper investment value for the vessel is opportunity cost. Leaving the 
conceptual issue aside and considering only practical matters, ownership groups were not long- 
lived  (see chapter  10). Consequently,  new  money  investments  in  old  whaling  vessels  were 
common. 
The depreciated new price figures tend to overstate profit rates because they understate some 
elements of  cost (e.g., imputed interest) and because they also understate the denominator of the 
profit rate. Under the right circumstances they can also lead to exaggerated rates of  loss, since, 
again, the denominator of the loss ratio is understated. 434  Chapter 11 
so thoroughly prepared for voyages that they were equivalent to new vessels 
when they set out. Clearly, that is an exaggeration. The assumption leads to 
overstatements of investment values and thus to understatements of the rate of 
profit and, under the right circumstances, the rate of loss. The second variant, 
however, may be no farther from the truth than the first. The true values are 
surely bounded by the two variants.  Similarly, in any given instance the true 
profit rate-or  true loss rate-for  a voyage is likely to lie between limits set 
by these two variants. With respect to aggregations of voyages, the first variant 
will produce the larger profit rates or, if there are losses, the larger loss rates. 
Depreciation during the voyage was calculated by applying to the invest- 
ment values of vessels the rates computed from the life-expectancy table. 
New vessel prices also changed as time passed. Quite apart from deprecia- 
tion, owners might incur capital losses due to a decline in vessel prices during 
the course of a voyage. If they were lucky and prices went the other way, they 
would obtain capital gains. Capital gains and losses certainly affected the suc- 
cess or failure of whaling firms, but they  arose out of the operation of the 
market for vessels, rather than out of the whaling activities of the firm.13  We 
therefore computed two sets of profits, one taking account of capital gains or 
losses, the other ignoring them. Most of the analysis here is based on the series 
exclusive of  capital gains and losses, that is, the series relating expressly to 
whaling operations. 
There are two ways to approach insurable risks: via the scanty information 
on insurance rates, and via the information on vessel losses in the New Bedford 
data set. The latter is clearly the better approach. Two sets of risks were esti- 
mated: the risk of destruction by a Confederate cruiser-a  substantial risk in 
the early 1860s-and  all others. 
Finally, there is the question of the representativeness of  the sample from 
which the profits calculations were made. The issues are similar to those re- 
garding productivity  discussed in chapter  8 (see table 8.1 and  surrounding 
text); they need not be treated at great length here.  Profit calculations were 
made for 2,757 voyages returning  to New  Bedford  in  1817 through  1892. 
Another  640-odd  voyages,  for which  there  is considerable  information  but 
not enough to estimate profits,  also ended in these years. The sample, then, 
contains over 80 percent  of  the observations in the universe  (2,75713,398- 
see table 11.  l).I4 
13. Remember that the market for vessels was affected by  circumstances in the merchant ma- 
rine, as well as by the situation in whaling. 
14. The term universe has the meaning implied by the previous sentence. That is, it refers to 
voyages returning in the years 1817 through 1892 for which there is information on at least one of 
the variables listed in table 11.  I. 
Table  11.1 is modeled after table 8.1. The data in the two tables differ in a number of respects, 
however. Chapter 8 is built around a regression analysis involving some lagged data. The relevant 
series begins in  1816, and the productivity calculations used in the regression therefore had to 
begin several years later. We chose to begin in 1821. There was no similar constraint for the begin- 
ning of  the profits calculations. The only requirement was that the calculations not include data 
from the period of the War of 1812. Consequently, the profits series begins earlier than the produc- 
tivity series. 435  Profits 
Table 11.1  Characteristics of the Voyages in the Profits Sample and of the 
Voyages Composing the Universe of New Bedford Whaling Voyages, 
1817-92 
A. Outputs and Inputs 
Sample 
(N = 2,757)  Universe  N  SamplelLTniverse 
Average output of 
Sperm oil (barrels) 
Whale oil (barrels) 
Baleen (pounds) 
802.9  758.9  3,398  1.058 
1,070.9  989.0  3,398  1.083 
9,333.5  8,336.0  3,398  1.120 
Average inputs 
Vessel size (tons)  323.3  306.4  3,467  1.055 
Interval at sea (months)  33.8  31.5  3,470  1.073 
Average value of catch ($)  52,478.4  41,738.2  3,398  1.099 
Average value of catch per 
ton-month ($)  4.802  4.946  -  0.971 
B. Distribution of Voyages among Hunting Grounds (%)b 
Universe  Sample 
Atlantic  32.1  25.4 
Indian  12.9  14.7 
Pacific  48.3  52.2 
Western Arctic  6.7  7.7 
Total  100.0  100.0 
Sources: Voyages and Profits data sets. 
Note: The years covered by the table are those in which voyages ended. 
"The average value of the catch per ton per month was computed from the average value of the 
catch, the average vessel tonnage, and the average interval at sea, which rely on universes of dif- 
fering sizes. 
voyages to one of these four grounds are reported (Hudson Bay and Davis Strait are included 
with the Atlantic). 
The sample is large. Is it also representative? In certain important respects 
it is. For example, the average tonnages of the vessels in the sample and in the 
Second, the profits calculations require data on the prices of vessels. These data run out in 1887 
(see table 6.10). Consequently, we could not compute profits for those few voyages that began 
after that date. There was no similar constraint with respect to productivity. The productivity series 
therefore ends later than the profits series. 
Third, the dates in table 8.1 (in fact, throughout chapter 8) refer to sailing dates, while the dates 
in table 11.1 (in fact, throughout chapter 11) refer to arrival dates; that is, table 8.1 records voyages 
that began  in the years 1821 through 1897, while table  11.1 records voyages that ended in the 
years 1817 through 1892. This means that the temporal overlap of the series used to analyze pro- 
ductivity and profits is more limited than the titles of the two tables suggest. If the title of table 
11.1 were changed so as to describe the sailing dates of the voyages treated in the table, it would 
refer to 1815 through  1887. The series described in table 11.1 thus begins six years earlier than 
the series described in table 8.1, and ends nine years earlier. The timing differences are unimport- 
ant, however, because there were relatively few whaling voyages from New Bedford beginning 
before  1821 or after 1887 (see table 2.5). Consequently, the analyses in chapters 8 and  I1 treat 
essentially the same data. 436  Chapter 11 
universe are within 6 percent of each other (see table 11.1).  The sample voyages 
resulted in relatively large catches-6  to 12 percent larger than for the uni- 
verse-but  they were also about 7 percent longer, on average. Consequently, 
the value of output per ton-month at sea is roughly the same for sample and uni- 
verse: the sample recorded an average value 2.9 percent below that for the 
universe. The distribution of voyages among the four hunting grounds is also 
reasonably similar, although the sample underrepresents the Atlantic ground 
by quite a bit and overrepresents the three other grounds by small amounts. 
These observations  do not demonstrate  beyond cavil that the sample is repre- 
sentative of  the universe, but they do suggest that findings drawn from the 
sample can be generalized. Even if the results are taken as only descriptive, 
they are descriptive of a very substantial fraction of the total number of New 
Bedford voyages in the period under discussion. 
The profit-rate estimates have  many  weaknesses. Nonetheless, they seem 
adequate to get at the most interesting questions concerning profits. Did rates 
fluctuate around a stable level, or did the level change over time? How did 
whaling’s profit rates compare with rates in other industries? Is there evidence 
that there were important returns to information or to innovation? 
The profit rate did fluctuate from year to year, as a glance at table 11.2 and 
figure 11.1 shows.15 The movements are frequently very  wide, but they  are 
fairly brief a string of increases or decreases never runs more than five years. 
There is the suggestion that the industry adjusted to profit rates, but that it 
repeatedly overshot the adjustment required to achieve equilibrium. Given the 
typical duration of  a whaling voyage, the length of  the  adjustment period 
seems reasonable. 
Of the two profit-rate series, variant B shows substantially lower values than 
variant A. Remember that the estimates of investments in vessels underlying 
these two sets of  calculations differ. Vessels are valued at net reproduction 
cost in the computations for the variant A profit-rate estimates, and at gross 
reproduction cost for the variant B estimates. Naturally, then, investments- 
the denominators of the profit-rate figures-are  smaller in the variant A than 
in the variant B series. Ceteris paribus, one could expect the variant A rates to 
be larger than variant B. 
In fact, ceteris are not paribus. The differences in the investment figures for 
the two series affect not only the denominators of the profit-rate calculations, 
but also the numerators (i.e., profits). The profit calculations are affected be- 
cause several of the cost estimates-insurance,  depreciation, and implicit in- 
terest-depend  upon the value of the vessel. Since the variant B series involves 
larger investments in vessels than the variant A series, the three elements of 
cost are larger for any voyage. That is, the profit ratios are computed from 
larger profit estimates and smaller investment figures in the case of variant A 
15. The rates for each year refer to the profits earned on voyages ending in that year. The activi- 
ties that yielded the profits often covered many years. Table 11.2  Mean Profit Rates of New Bedford Whaling Voyages, Several 
Variants, 1817-92 (percentages) 
Excluding Capital Gains 
Including Capital  and Losses 
Gains and Losses, 
Amval Year  N  Variant A  Variant A  Variant B 



















































































































































































































3.4 Table 11.2  (continued) 
Excluding Capital Gains 
Including Capital  and Losses 
Gains and Losses, 



































18  17-26 








































































































































































16.7 Table 11.2  (continued) 
Excluding Capital Gains 
Including Capital  and Losses 
Gains and Losses, 
Amval Year  N  Variant A  Variant A  Variant B 













































































































































































2.3 440  Chapter 11 
Table 11.2  (continued) 
Excluding Capital Gains 
Including Capital  and Losses 
Gains and Losses, 
Arrival Year  N  Variant A  Variant A  Variant B 
1868-77 
1869-78 











































C. Overall Averages 
18  17-92  13.8  13.7  6.6 
Source: Profits Data Set. 
Note: Variant A rates are based on estimates of net reproduction cost investment, variant B on 
estimates of  gross reproduction cost. See the text. 
"The number of  voyages refers only to the last two columns. The profit-rate variant including 
capital gains and losses cannot be calculated for voyages this year because necessary figures for 
vessel-construction cost are not available. 
bAverages  of  the rates in panel A, weighted by numbers of voyages. 
than in the case of variant B. Thus there are two explanations for the difference 
between the variants,  and it is not  surprising that the  variant A profit rates 
are higher. 
Since several factors influence the levels of the series, one should not expect 
that the two would necessarily move together, and their patterns of change are 
indeed somewhat different. For example, variant A is more volatile. Perhaps 
more interesting, the relative  levels of the two  series and their year-to-year 
movements vary from time to time. Compare the two sets of estimates for the 
years 18  17-1  8 and 1852-53. These figures suggest the complexity of the con- 
nections between the two series; they are by no means related  in a simple, 
linear way.  If one is interested in the details of the profit record, such as the 
relative  profitability  of voyages returning  in, say,  1849 and  1850, then  it is 
necessary  to consult both series. If  one is interested in the broad patterns  of 
change, the two series are more nearly interchangeable. For example, the tim- 
ing of annual fluctuations in profit rates is very similar in the two series, and 441  Profits 
-10 ' 
1817  1827  1837  1847  1857  1867  1877  1887 
Fig. 11.1  Mean profit rates of New Bedford whaling voyages, 1817-92,  three 
variants (1 = var. A, with capital gains, 2 = var. A, 3 = var. B) 
Nure: The text explains how the vanants were computed. 
the broad movements over longer periods are essentially the same. For treat- 
ment of the big picture, the two series seem equally useful.16 
Apart from short-term fluctuations, the most interesting feature of table 11.2 
and figure 11.1 is that they show, in the early years, high profit rates to be more 
common than low ones, while the reverse is true of  the later years. For ex- 
ample, in fifteen of the first twenty years in the table, variant A profits were 
above the average for the entire period,  1817-92;  in variant B, the proportion 
is seventeen out of twenty. Of the next fifty-six years, only nineteen were un- 
usually profitable according to the variant A series, only fourteen according to 
variant B. During the first period the industry expanded very rapidly (see table 
1.2); the profit-rate data are consistent with a standard view of profits in com- 
petition: high rates induced firms to enter, and the industry expanded. Eventu- 
ally, something approximating competitive equilibrium emerged. 
There is a question, however, as to the duration of  the period of marked 
expansion. Merchant vessels could easily be converted into whalers. The capi- 
16. The differences between the levels of variants A and B are important when returns in whal- 
ing are compared with returns in other industries. See below. 442  Chapter 11 
tal stock could, in principle,  be expanded very rapidly. Why then did it take 
twenty years for the profit rate to fall to levels approximating a long-run equi- 
librium? The most plausible answer is that demand for the products of the 
whale fishery was growing so rapidly that, even with dramatic increases in the 
capacity of the industry, profits remained for a long time above the long-run 
equilibrium level. The data reviewed in chapters 2 (prices) and 9 (the growth 
of demand) are consistent with this interpretation. In any case, the process 
pictured in the table and figure does look very much like a long-term expansion 
toward equilibrium profit rates. 
After the first twenty years (1  8 17-36)  profit rates fluctuated around an essen- 
tially unchanging level.” During the first part of this period-down  to the mid- 
1840s-the  industry was still expanding, then it stabilized for a time, then it 
contracted. A question immediately arises: if it took thirty years of high profits 
to expand the industry to its peak level, why didn’t it take thirty years of losses 
to liquidate it? The profit rates after the mid-1840s were not as high as those 
in the earlier years, but they were not low by any other standard. There is the 
suggestion that the industry contracted at a pace that kept profits at a reason- 
able level. Firms got out of the industry at close to an optimal rate. 
There are probably three explanations for this record. The first major con- 
traction of the industry was forced, not by unfavorable returns (at least not of 
the usual sort), but by the Civil War-in  particular the activities of Confederate 
cruisers and the assembly of the Stone Fleet. The cruisers demolished all the 
whalers they  could  find-which  were many-and  kept others from plying 
their trade outside the North Atlantic. Whaling agents sold their idle vessels to 
the government to be sunk at the entrances to Charleston and Savannah harbors 
in a largely futile attempt to obstruct entry and exit. Therefore, after the war 
the fleet was already smaller than it had been before the war. Profit rates were 
not sufficient to induce many firms that had left the industry to return. The big 
downward adjustment of the size of the fleet was occasioned by external forces, 
not by low or negative profits arising out of commercial conditions. 
Later two events of a similar nature caused the fleet to shrink. In 1871 and 
in 1876 a substantial part of the Arctic whaling fleet was caught in the ice and 
destroyed. Once again, the decline took place without the impetus of market- 
induced  low profit  rates.  In  all three  instances  a  fortuitous drop in  supply 
helped to compensate for the effects on profits of a declining demand. 
If these developments are not sufficient to explain the decline of the fleet in 
the absence of substantial market losses, perhaps the explanation lies in the 
fact that it was easier to liquidate the fleet than it was to create it. Vessels could 
be quickly converted  to other uses. Most whaling agents and owners had a 
second string to their bow (see chapter lo), so that they could leave whaling to 
engage in some other pursuit. As for the seamen, their fate was probably not 
17. See the decadal averages in table 11.2. The varianr B series appears to drop again slightly 
toward the end of the century. 443  Profits 
the foremost concern of owners and agents. In any case, the corps of seamen 
had begun to shrink long before the industry was wound up. The Civil War and 
Arctic losses were the events that left the seamen adrift, if anything did. 
The hunting grounds were opened at various dates. Economic theory sug- 
gests that profit rates must have been higher in the new grounds initially, but 
that, as time passed and more vessels moved into them, rates in the various 
grounds must have converged.'8 In the years just after the War of  1812, both 
the Atlantic and the Pacific were being hunted; the Indian Ocean was reopened 
somewhat later, and the Western Arctic opened later still.19 One would expect 
to find the profit rates of vessels returning from the Indian Ocean or Western 
Arctic to be relatively high at first, but eventually to drift downward toward the 
rates being earned in the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
Such a convergence is, indeed, what the record shows (see table 11.4). Be- 
fore the Civil War, vessels returning from the Indian Ocean had higher profit 
rates than those returning from the Atlantic in twenty-two of the twenty-eight 
years for which the comparison can be made. For vessels returning from the 
Western Arctic, rates were higher than those earned in the Atlantic in nine of 
ten years before the war. After the war there are clear indications that the advan- 
tage of the newer grounds had been eliminated. In the thirty-one instances in 
which a comparison can be made between the Atlantic and one of the other 
two grounds, the higher rate was earned in the Atlantic in seventeen, in the 
other ground in fourteen. Again, there is a strong suggestion of an adjustment 
process at work. 
One feature of these data is puzzling. On the whole the Pacific was the least 
profitable ground of all. For example, in fifty-three of the seventy-two years in 
which a comparison can be made, vessels returning from the Atlantic had the 
higher profit rate.*O Since the Pacific was the newer ground, one might expect 
it to register higher rates, at least in the early years; but it is in the early years 
that the comparison with the Atlantic is especially unfavorable. 
Narrowing the focus to the period in which the Pacific was the main hunting 
ground produces a somewhat different impression. Down to the late 1830s the 
Atlantic was the ground more often hunted. In the early 1840s the number of 
voyages to the Atlantic declined and the number to the Pacific expanded. By 
18. The convergence would be incomplete if risks varied by hunting ground. A test of the follow- 
ing form was run to check this possibility, as well as the possibility that risk changed over time. 
The variance of the profit rate divided by the mean was regressed on time and hunting-ground 
dummies, with the results in table 11.3. The fit is very poor and the significance levels are low. 
19. The Indian Ocean was hunted by New Bedford vessels as early as 1793, but relatively few 
voyages were made, and between 18  10 and 1830 only four. 
20. The reader may recall that the regression reproduced in table 8.2 shows that productivity 
was higher in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. How is it, then, that profit rates were lower in the 
Pacific? The explanation is that the productivity comparisons were made holding many other vari- 
ables constant, which is not the case for the profit-rate comparisons. Introducing profit rates as 
dependent variables in regressions of the form of the one in table 8.2 yields results similar to those 
in table 8.2-that  is, profit rates in the Atlantic are shown to be lower than those in the Pacific, 
ceteris paribus. 444  Chapter 11 
Table 11.3  Regression of Profit Rate Divided by the Mean, on Time and 
Hunting-Ground Dummies 
Coefficient  Prob >  I  TI 
Intercept  -0.0539  0.939 
Ground 1  0.9104  0.161 
Ground 2  0.1473  0.838 
Ground 4  -0.0257  0.978 
Time  0.0045  0.75  1 
Notes: Prob >  F = 0.658. Adjusted R’  = -0.0077. 
1844, for example, the Atlantic returned only four vessels to New Bedford, 
while forty-two came back from the Pacific.2’ In this  later period the profit 
rates of the two grounds are more nearly comparable. Particularly important is 
that between  1844 and 1864-the  heyday of the Pacific, when the ground re- 
turned between twenty-seven  and sixty-three vessels to New Bedford annu- 
ally-the  average annual profit rate of Pacific vessels was greater than that of 
Atlantic vessels in ten of the twenty years that comparisons are possible (table 
11.4). The two grounds seem to have been at parity during this period.*’ The 
relatively new Indian Ocean hunting grounds continued to be more profitable 
(as did the Western Arctic), recording higher rates than the Pacific in eleven 
years between 1844 and 1864. 
The industry experienced in expansion, then brief stability, and finally a con- 
traction that appears to have been negotiated without severe commercial losses. 
Hunting was redistributed among the various grounds in response to profit-rate 
differentials. Given this evidence, can an equilibrium profit rate be identified? 
Consider the possibilities. 
First, perhaps the profit rates earned in the years during which the industry 
neither expanded nor contracted should be regarded as equilibrium rates, since 
there is, in the evidence on the size of the industry, a suggestion of equilibrium. 
The average rate (variant A) for this period-1846  through  1860-is  about 
14.9 percent,  compared  to  a  13.7 percent  average rate  for the  full period, 
Second, perhaps equilibrium profits can be identified with a period of zero 
trend in the profit rate. From the decade 1837-46  until 1892, the decadal aver- 
18  17-92. 
21. The data on voyage numbers cited in this paragraph differ slightly from the data in table 
11.4. The text data refer to all voyages; the table 11.4 data refer to voyages for which profit rates 
could be produced. 
22. A possible explanation (partial) for the relatively poor performance of the Pacific has to do 
with measurement error. Although we intended to include in output all the oil and bone shipped 
home in advance of a vessel’s return to New Bedford, it is likely that the data on shipments are 
incomplete. Since Pacific voyages were typically longer and therefore led to relatively more prod- 
uct’s being shipped home than did Atlantic voyages, the failure to count all output shipped home 
in advance would probably have a bigger effect on the profit rates of voyages to the Pacific than 
of those to the Atlantic. We do not believe that the problem is a serious one, however. Table 11.4  Mean Annual Profit Rates of New Bedford Whaling Voyages, by 
Hunting Ground, Variant A (excluding capital gains and capital 
losses in vessels), 1817-92 (percentages) 
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62.0  2 
275.1  1 
19.7  12 
14.6  22 
14.5  16 
42.6  13 
21.4  16 
20.0  15 
15.7  11 
10.5  11 
2.9  12 
2.6  16 446  Chapter 11 
Table 11.4  (continued) 
Arrival Year  Atlantic"  N  Indian  N  Pacific  N  Western Arctic  N 
1863  17.6 
1864  165.7 
1865  47.8 
1866  32.3 
I867  6.0 
1868  12.8 
1869  3.4 
1870  -9.9 
1871  11.0 
I872  -4.9 
1873  35.5 
I874  91.6 
1875  40.2 
1876  31.8 
1877  73.9 
1878  5.9 
1879  -2.2 
1880  6.4 
1881  9.7 
1882  21.2 
1883  -3.9 
1884  4.5 
1885  8.3 
1886  9.4 
1887  14.6 
1888  11.1 
1889 
1890  23.9 
1891 



























































































































































































Source: Profits Data Set. 
Notr: The means are unweighted. 
"Atlantic voyages include voyages to Hudson Bay and Davis Strait. 
age profit rates seem to fluctuate around  a stable level, suggesting that the 
industry might have been in something roughly approximating equilibrium. 
True, early in the period the industry was expanding, and toward the end it was 
contracting; but these changes did not greatly affect the general level of  the 
profit rate. During this period the average variant A rate was almost 12 percent, 
compared to the 14.9 percent rate for the years 1846-60 and the 13.7 percent 
rate for the entire period. 
There is yet a third criterion. The equilibrium rate might be thought to be 
the one earned during the years in which the reallocation  of  effort to newer 
hunting grounds was over-that  is, in  the period in which the new hunting 
grounds no longer enjoyed a profit advantage. These were the years following 447  Profits 
the Civil War, and the variant A rate earned during this period (1  866-92)  was 
about 9.7 percent. 
The three averages range, then, from 9.7 to 14.9 percent; the variant B esti- 
mates would be about one-half as large. These figures, however, are very much 
affected by  extreme values. A better estimate of the approximate level of the 
equilibrium rate might be obtained from the median. As is to be expected, the 
median rates cluster closer together: 1846-60  = 9.7 percent,  1866-92  = 8.1 
percent, and  1846-92  = 8.9 percent. Rounding these numbers gives a range 
of 8 to  10 percent for the equilibrium rate, which may very well bracket the 
true rate. The equilibrium rate excludes excess profits, of course, but it includes 
not simply the costs of Knightian uninsurable risks, but also returns to knowl- 
edge and unusual skill. (Schumpeterian returns to innovation should be part of 
the disequilibrium profits.) 
How the components of the equilibrium rate should be separately identified 
in quantitative terms is not clear. The data set, however, does contain evidence 
on the profits earned on voyages managed by the various whaling agents. Some 
sense of the range of experience by firm can be obtained from these data. Thus, 
the scale on which agents were rewarded for knowledge and skill-as  well as 
for persistent, successful innovation-might  be judged.23 
Profit rates varied widely from voyage to voyage, partly due to luck. Further- 
more, many agents stayed in the business only a short time. If one is interested 
in returns to knowledge,  skill, and innovative activity, it is only  sensible to 
explore the records of agent firms that managed many voyages, and to look at 
their average experience rather than at the results of individual voyages. Pre- 
sumably self-selection and accumulated experience made these agents the re- 
pository of special knowledge and skills. If they stayed in the business for long, 
they must at least have kept up with innovations. 
Table 11.5 reports the profits on the voyages managed by those twenty-nine 
agents who organized at least forty voyages. These agents were an important 
group: they accounted for over one-half of the voyages in the Voyages Data 
Set, and well over one-half of the voyages for which profit-rate estimates can 
be made. The first and third columns contain two sets of calculations: the aver- 
age profit rate earned on the voyages the firm managed throughout its entire 
history, and the ratio of that rate to the average rate earned by  all the firm’s 
whaling competitors in  the  years in  which  it had vessels  returning to New 
Bedford. 
All of these firms but two averaged positive profits on all their voyages. That 
is, each of these firms-except  the two-managed  to pay competitive rates of 
23. The estimates of profits for each individual voyage are only rough approximations to true 
profits, of course, and therefore the results obtained for individual agents are also only approxima- 
tions to what is required. Regardless of these considerations, however, the very  striking results 
obtained for the individual agents seem secure. See the earlier sections of this chapter for a treat- 
ment of the methods by which profit estimates were made, as well as a discussion of the shortcom- 
ings of the estimates. Table 11.5  Average Profit Rates Earned on Voyages Managed by New Bedford Whaling Agents Who Organized at Least Forty Voyages, 
Variant A (excluding capital gains and capital losses in vessels), 1817-92 
Ratio of Column 1 
Profit Rate  Coefficient of  to Profit Rates  Total Number  Number of Voyages 
Firm  (%)  Variation  of Competitors"  Relative Feesb  of Voyages'  in Computationd 
Gideon Allen; Gideon Allen & Son; Gilbert 
John P.  Knowles I1 
Edward W.  Howland 
George Howland; George & Matthew 
Abraham H. Howland 
Edward C. Jones 
Frederick Swift; William C. N. Swift & Eben 
Perry; William H. Aiken & Frederick Swift 
Henry Taber & Co. 
Charles H. Gifford; Gifford & Cummings; 
William Gifford 
Charles W.  Morgan 
Isaac Howland Jr. & Co. 
Samuel Rodman; Sylvanus Thomas & Co.; 
Sylvanus Thomas & William F.  Dow 
Abraham Barker 
Alexander Gibbs 
Joseph & William R. Wing 
Jonathan Bourne; Jonathan Bourne Jr. 
Benjamin B. Howard 
Jireh Perry 

































































































62 John Avery Parker; John Avery Parker & Son 
Charles R. Tucker; Charles R. Tucker & Co. 
James B. Wood & Co. 
Thomas Knowles; Thomas Knowles & Co. 
Ivory H. Bartlett; Ivory H. Bartlett & Son; 
Loum Snow; Loum Snow & Son; Thomas 
William Lewis; William Lewis & Son 
Matthew Luce; William Hathaway Jr.; William 
Thomas & Asa R. Nye; Thomas R. Nye Jr. 
David R. Greene & Co. 
Mean, all voyages 
Mean, all voyages managed by agents who 
Total 
Ivory H. Bartlett & Sons 
Cook & Loum Snow 
Hathaway Jr. & Matthew Luce 






















































2,444  1,566 
Source; Profits Data Set. 
Notes: Agencies that changed names but exhibited continuity with respect to the principal members of the firm were treated as one firm. For example, the three firms, 
Charles H.  Gifford, Gifford and Cummings, and William Gifford, were treated as one firm. 
“or  each voyage managed by a firm for which a profit rate can be calculated, the mean profit rate for all voyages agented by competing firms that arrived in the same 
year was computed. The entries in this column are the ratios of the means of the subject firms’ profit rates to the means of the means of the competitors’ rates. For 
example, say an agency managed three voyages, ending in 1820, 1820, and 1822. Its profit rates on these voyages were 10.2,  18.1, and 5.6. In 1820 the profit rates of 
its competitors’ voyages averaged 8.1, in 1822,7.5. The subject firm’s mean profit rate would be 11.3. Its competitors’ would be 7.9. The ratio would be 1.43 (11.3U.9). 
The  fee-earning ability of the named agency compared to the abilities of all other agencies that had vessels returning to New Bedford in the same years 
‘Each entry gives the number of voyages in the Voyages Data Set that the agent managed, during the course of the life of the agency. 
dNumber  of voyages for which profit rates could be (and were) calculated. 450  Chapter 11 
Table 11.6  Profit-Rate Distributions for Voyages Managed by the Leading 
Twenty-Nine Firms and All Other Firms, New Bedford Whaling 
Voyages, 1817-92 (percentages) 
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Source: Profits Data Set. 
interest to investors, competitive fees to agents, and an average rate of profit 
on capital ranging, among firms, from almost 4.5 percent to almost 60 percent. 
Unless whaling  firms were very risk-averse  indeed, these  firms must be re- 
garded  as  successful. The top  nine  or ten  were  extraordinarily  successful; 
words fail one, when the record of  Gideon Allen and his son is considered. 
Could that figure be right? Could Allen et fils really have taken home almost 
60 percent,  on average, for sixty-four voyages, in addition  to the fees they 
earned as agent and the interest return on capital invested? It seems so. 
The meaning to be given the profit record of  Gideon Allen-and  for that 
matter David Greene, the Nyes, Ivory Bartlett, and William Lewis-must  be 
tempered, however, by a recognition of the variability of the voyage rates and 
the skewedness of the distributions. All of the voyage profit-rate distributions 
are skewed-usually  to the right-and  all exhibit considerable variability (see 
table 11.6). But those recorded by Allen, Greene, the Nyes, Bartlett, and Lewis 
have extraordinarily large coefficients of variation, as compared with the other 
firms in this group (see table 11  ..5).24 
The unusually  large coefficients  of  variation  reveal the existence of  pro- 
nounced outlier voyages, yielding unusually large profit or loss rates. All have 
two characteristics in common: they were short voyages carried out by elderly 
vessels. Since they were short, the net investments in subsistence items for the 
crew and outfitting expenses were small; that is, the value of these items con- 
sumed on the voyage was small. Since the vessels were old, their net (depreci- 
ated) reproduction costs were low. Total investment in each of these extreme 
outlier voyages was therefore small. 
In several instances an outlier voyage was short because some disaster-for 
24. The coefficients of variation are also large compared with virtually all of  the rest of  the 
firms represented in the Profits Data Set. 451  Profits 
example, the death of the captain-brought  the vessel quickly back to port. 
Vessels returning within a few months of setting out were unlikely to bring 
home much, if anything, in the way  of  output. The investors suffered losses 
that, perhaps not large in absolute terms, were large compared with the invest- 
ment in the voyage. Thus, loss rates of 100 percent or more were recorded. 
Some short voyages, however, were short not because of disaster, but be- 
cause of striking success. For example, Gideon Allen's  Milwood  returned in 
1864 after six months at sea with a catch valued  at $172,841. Of the  1,566 
voyages underlying the data in table 11  5,  only 24 returned with output valued 
at more than $172,841. The shortest of them took 30 months; the longest was 
103 months; twenty-two took 40 months or more. 
The Milwood's  achievement, then, was very great. She was an old vessel 
(fifty-eight years);  the investment  in her outfitting  costs was very little; her 
operating costs for six months were slight; and she brought back an unusually 
valuable cargo. The profit rate on this voyage-by  far the highest profit rate in 
the data set-was  over 3,000 percent. 
The large loss and profit rates on short voyages are real enough and deserve 
to be taken into account, but they tend to obscure the day-to-day level of suc- 
cess achieved by the outlier firms. In the cases of these firms-the  five with 
unusually large coefficients of variation-it  is helpful to look at other indexes 
of central tendency. For example, although Gideon Allen's  average profit rate 
far exceeds the rates of the other four, this is not true of his median or trimmed 
mean rate (table 11.7). His mean weighted rate (weighted by voyage duration) 
is higher than the averages of the other four agents, but well below his un- 
weighted average rate. David Greene and the Nyes, whose unweighted average 
rates are negative, both have positive rates according to all of the other mea- 
Table 11.7  Profit Rates Earned on Voyages Managed by Five Leading 
Nineteenth-Century New Bedford Whaling Agent Firms, Measures of 
Central Tendency (percentages) 
Mean, Excluding  Mean, Weighted 
Trimmed  Voyages < 6  by Voyage 
Mean  Median  Mean"  Months  Duration 
Gideon Allen; Gideon 
Allen & Son; Gilbert 
Allen  59.2  4.9  5.7  61.4  16.7 
Ivory H. Bartlett; Ivory H. 
Banlett & Son; Ivory H. 
Bartlett & Sons  7.4  5.5  5.4  13.3  9.3 
William Lewis; William 
Lewis & Son  4.6  -1.4  -1.0  4.6  4.2 
Thomas & Asa R. Nye; 
Thomas R. Nye Jr.  -2.3  9.1  1.3  13.3  8.6 
David R. Greene & Co.  -2.5  17.3  15.2  19.5  14.4 
The mean of  the set of profit rates lying within the interquartile range. 452  Chapter 11 
sures. It is clear that, leaving aside a few outlier voyages, four of the five firms 
performed in roughly comparable fashion. William Lewis by all accounts was 
less successful than the rest. The outlier voyages cannot be ignored, but neither 
should their results be regarded as typical of the performance of these firms. 
There is a second respect in which comparisons among the average profit 
rates recorded in the first column of table 11.5 are not entirely legitimate. The 
firms did not operate over precisely the same periods of time; their profit rates 
are therefore not fully comparable. The third column of the table contains esti- 
mates put together to deal with this problem. It compares the average rate of 
profit of each agent across the career of the firm with the profit rates earned by 
the other agents operating in the same period of time. The rankings change 
little. The differences among firms apparently were not much affected by the 
time periods during which they operated. 
Agents were subject to divided loyalties. Owners-and  agents as owners- 
did best if  profits were maximized.  But  agents as managers  did best if  the 
value of output was maximized, since their fees depended importantly on this 
variable. Agents may well have been biased in their managerial practices in the 
direction of  extending the duration of the voyage in order to maximize the 
value of output-perhaps  at the cost of  the profit rate. If that were the case, 
agents who seem to have been relatively  unsuccessful, against the standard 
of profits, might be shown to be more successful if fees were factored into 
the account. 
The fourth column of table 11.5 indicates whether firms did better than (+), 
worse than (-),  or just as well as (0) their competitors  in earning fees per 
voyage. The strong suggestion is that the firms earning the highest profits also 
did unusually well with fees. 
Although  these  data  give  no indication  that  agents  with relatively  weak 
profit-rate records were able to recoup by manipulating voyages to maximize 
output and thus fees, there is some evidence that an output-maximizing motive 
played a role in determining the behavior of agents. The evidence is drawn 
from a sample of 239 voyages. Enough information concerning these voyages 
is available to analyze the relationship between voyage length and the agent’s 
investment share. The most obvious area in which the interests of agents and 
owners might come into conflict is voyage length. An agent who had invested 
little might be tempted to keep the vessel at sea longer than the optimal time, 
since extending the voyage would be the principal way in which output could 
be augmented. An agent who had invested much would presumably  be less 
tempted to extend the voyage to increase returns from fees. 
To  test this proposition, the following regression was run: 
voyage duration  =a + b agent’s share in the investment 
+c ground dummies + d time 
+e the tonnage of the vessel. 453  Profits 
Table 11.8  Determinants of Voyage Duration 
Coefficient  Prob > IT1 
Intercept  36.635  0.0001 
Agent’s investment  -4.189  0.1597 
Atlantic”  -  16.385  0.0001 
Indian“  -2.907  0.2299 
Western Arctic”  -2.109  0.2926 
Time  0.079  0.1699 
Tonnage  0.013  0.2710 
Source: Profits Data Set. 
Notes; Fvalue = 17.714. Prob >  F = 0.0001. Adjusted R2  = 0.2964 
Tomparison base = Pacific. 
The ground dummies and the time and tonnage variables were intended to take 
into account the chief determinants of voyage duration, apart from luck and 
the output-maximizing  tendency  of the agent.2s The results are presented  in 
table  11.8. The sign on the coefficient  of  the variable agent’s investment is 
consistent with the idea that the strength of the output-maximizing motive was 
inversely related to the share of the voyage owned by the agent. The effect is 
not large, however. On average the voyage of a vessel completely owned by its 
agent was, ceteris paribus, only about four months shorter than the voyage of 
a vessel of which the agent owned only one-thirty-second.  The significance 
level is also not high. The regression provides only a modicum of support for 
the  view  that the power  of  the  output-maximizing  motive  was  greater,  the 
smaller the investment share of the agent. 
To return to the main point to be taken from table 11.5, it is clear that the 
issue treated early in this chapter-the  qualification of the competitive situa- 
tion by the differing knowledge, skills, and innovative activities of agents-is 
important. The Howlands, the Swifts and Perrys and Aikens, John Knowles, 
and Edward Jones knew something valuable, and it was knowledge that was 
not widely shared. As to the rest of these agents who frequently sent vessels to 
sea, their records do not look so good in comparison with the records of their 
peers. But remember, their peers included such extraordinary businessmen as 
John Knowles and the rest of that able lot. Placed  against another standard, 
most of the agents who fail the test of relative performance still did very well. 
Most of them paid their investors a competitive rate of return, paid themselves 
substantial  fees, and earned for themselves  and the other owners  attractive 
profit rates. 
The very successful members of this group of experienced agent firms were 
clearly earning returns  to knowledge and skill, or Schumpeterian returns to 
innovation, or both. How important were these returns when compared with 
25. Voyages of brigs, schooners, and sloops were eliminated from the sample. There were few 
of these voyages, and there were special circumstances influencing their duration. 454  Chapter 11 
average rates of return in the industry? A lower-bound estimate can easily be 
computed. The average rate of return (variant A) of all the voyages in the Profits 
Data Set, except  for those managed by agent firms that ran at least forty voy- 
ages and that also earned an average rate of return greater than the industry 
average (13.7 percent), is 10.7 percent.26  That is, excluding from the calcula- 
tion those firms that most obviously earned returns from special knowledge 
and from innovation, the average rate of return for the industry drops by  3.0 
percentage points, or about one-fifth.?’ Compared with the probable equilib- 
rium profit rate of  between 8 and 10 percent, the extra returns of the excep- 
tional firms bulk even larger, averaging between  30 and almost 38 percent of 
the equilibrium rate. 
Finally, and both most appropriate and most impressive, the average rate of 
return  (weighted by number of voyages) of the leading dozen agents was al- 
most  11 percentage points higher than the returns of the firms against which 
they directly competed. The figure would be much higher if  the calculations 
included among competitors only firms that were not themselves among the 
top dozen. 
It should be clear, then, that returns to special knowledge, exceptional skill, 
and innovative activity, taken together, were substantial. At the very least they 
accounted for one-sixth of total returns. Additionally, if equilibrium profits did 
run between  8 and  10 percent, as previously  suggested, excess profits must 
have averaged between  3.7 and 5.7 percent, across the entire period (overall 
average  rate  of  profit  of  13.7 percent,  minus  the  estimates  of  equilibrium 
profits). A reasonable guess would divide profits among sources in roughly the 
following way: 
Excess profits: 
(13.7 minus 10.0 equals) 
(13.7 minus 8.0 equals) 
(13.7 minus 10.7 equals) 
(13.7 minus [3.7 plus 3.01 equals) 







Returns to knowledge, skill, and innovation: 
Payments for bearing uninsurable risk and uncertainty: 
or 
26. To compute this figure, average profit rates were weighted by voyages, rather than by years 
27. Excluding the record-setting voyage of the Milwood, the industry average is 12.5 percent, 
28. Omitting the voyage of the Milwood, the figures would be: 
or investment. 
and the margin over the average rate of profit of  the body of  the industry is 1.8 percent. 
(12.5 minus 10.0  equals) 
(12.5 minus 8.0 equals) 
2.5 percent 
4.5 percent 
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Finally, how do the rates of return to whaling investment compare with those 
in other lines of activity? One would expect rates to vary from one type of 
business to another, reflecting  differences in business risks, in the degree of 
control over the market exercised by firms, in the information possessed by the 
various firms in each industry, in the extent to which firms engaged in success- 
ful innovative action, and in the relationship between the observed figure and 
the equilibrium rate of profits in each activity. The simple comparison of rates 
of  return is not likely to take one very  far toward  conclusions of historical 
importance. As Gavin Wright (1973, 5) puts it, “[Tlhere is an irreducible in- 
conclusiveness about specifying ‘correct’ or ‘competitive’ rates of return in a 
world of uncertainty.” Establishing the extent of market imperfections and the 
effects of innovations  is also difficult. The problem is compounded because 
the rates that are available for comparison refer to a few isolated years, so that 
the question of the state of  the market-the  extent to which it deviates from 
long-run  equilibrium-is  especially  important.  Finally,  rates  available  for 
other industries rest on earnings data that combine all property returns-rents, 
interest, profits-and  frequently some managerial salaries. If the whaling fig- 
ures are to be juxtaposed to data for other industries, either the former must be 
augmented by estimates of the returns-other  than profits-to  all property, or 
net profit rates must be derived for the other industries. It is easier and safer to 
augment the whaling data. 
As is well known,  the  measured  nineteenth-century  rates  of return  were 
higher in manufacturing and railroading than in agriculture (see table 11  .9).29 
The usual interpretation of this result is that it represents a true difference- 
that is, a difference that produced a relative expansion of the two more profit- 
able sectors and a relative contraction of the third. There are at least four other 
interpretations,  all  of  which  are typically  mentioned  in treatments  of  this 
subject. 
First, farmers were engaged in a very close approximation to perfect compe- 
tition,  whereas most manufacturing  firms, large and small, and all railroads 
participated in markets characterized by substantial control on the part of the 
sellers. The same situation may have existed with respect  to steamboats on 
Returns to knowledge, skill, and innovation: 
Payments for bearing uninsurable risk and uncertainty: 
(12.5 minus 10.7 equals) 
(12.5 minus [2.5 plus 1.81 equals 





See also the roughly consistent results in table  10.14, panel C. The profit rate involved  in the 
calculations of  table 10.14 is variant B, whereas the one discussed in the text here is variant A. 
Variant A rates are always higher than variant B rates. 
29. Most of  the data refer to accounting profits, but, as Atack and Baternan (1990, 3-4)  point 
out, “recent  studies show accounting profit to be an  acceptable proxy for the internal rate of 
return.” 456  Chapter 11 
Table 11.9  Rates of Return for New Bedford Whaling and Various Industrial 
Sectors, Nineteenth Century (percentages) 
Nineteenth 
1850  1860  1870  1880  Century 
Manufacturing  15.4  23.7  32.9  14.9  21.7" 
North  8.0  10.3  9.2 
South, cotton  9.7-10.0 
Trunk  8.5 
Tributary  24.1 
Agriculture 
Steamboats 
Central Pacific Railroad  13.4b 
New Bedford whaling  15.2-24.0  9.0-13.7  1.2-1.7  4.6-8.7  11.7-18.9' 
Sources; For whaling rates  see the text. Rates include profits  and imputed interest. Other rates 
come from Atack and Bateman 1990, tables 2,4,5,  6,  8, 12. 
'Averages of figures in the table. 
bPrivate unaided rate of return, 1863-1908. 
'Averages of  1817-92. 
tributaries-that  is, small markets dominated by a few firms. One would ex- 
pect to find higher profit rates in these sectors than in agriculture. The same 
consideration must be borne in mind when whaling returns are compared with 
those from manufacturing, railroads, and steamboats on tributaries. 
Second, the rates of return in manufacturing are biased upward, because the 
returns attributed to property include some managerial salaries and because 
interest costs were estimated on the basis of eastern market data, and no allow- 
ance was made for the higher interest costs prevailing  in other parts of the 
country. 
Third, it is possible that levels of  business risk differed by  sector. For ex- 
ample, whaling  may  have been riskier than agriculture, manufacturing, rail- 
roading, and steamboating, although that is by no means certain. 
Finally, profit rates varied from year to year. For example, in 1880 the profit 
rate in whaling was substantially lower than that in manufacturing; if the whal- 
ing data for 1877 are substituted, whaling becomes very much more profitable 
than manufacturing. The whaling data refer to only one industry in one town. 
Thus whaling's profit rates could be expected to be more volatile than those of 
agriculture  or  manufacturing-large  economic  sectors  spread  over  wide 
areas-if  not of steamboating or railroading. The manufacturing rate, however, 
was also highly volatile, according to the limited information available: it fell 
by more than one-half between 1870 and 1880 (see table 11.9). Clearly, com- 
parisons should not be drawn among single-year estimates, but among averages 
computed across many years of experience. 
Unfortunately, the data are not rich enough to permit such comparisons. The 457  Profits 
evidence reported in the last column of table 11.9 is the closest possible ap- 
proximation to the required information. It appears that the profit rate in whal- 
ing was, on average, higher than that in agriculture, perhaps chiefly because 
whaling  was  the  riskier  industry,  but  perhaps  also  because  it  experienced 
expansion during part of this period.30 The whaling rate was also probably 
higher than the rate enjoyed by the Central Pacific Railroad, the effects of the 
greater risk and disequilibrium profits in whaling overbalancing the effects of 
the monopoly position of the Central Pacific. In contrast, the average measured 
rate in manufacturing seems to have been somewhat higher than that in whal- 
ing. The manufacturing  estimate may be biased  upward,  and manufacturers 
may have enjoyed some monopoly profits.”  Perhaps most important, the esti- 
mate for whaling probably represents something closer to the equilibrium rate 
than does the estimate for manufacturing. The latter sector was expanding rap- 
idly throughout the period-a  fact suggesting that  substantial excess profits 
were being made. 
In summary, the data on profits indicate that the New Bedford whaling in- 
dustry was in disequilibrium from 1817 through the late  1830s: profit rates 
were persistently high and new firms were induced to join the industry. As the 
market moved toward equilibrium, the fleet continued to expand, but at a more 
sedate pace. At times, additions to the fleet were made too rapidly, the profit 
rate temporarily  fell, and growth came to a brief  halt. Tendencies  toward  a 
more fundamental  downward  adjustment  appeared  in  the  late  1850s. They 
were dramatically accentuated by the activities of the Confederate Navy during 
the Civil War. Contraction continued in the postwar years, but by the end of 
the  1860s the  timing of  the  decline  in the fleet  fit market requirements  so 
closely  that profit rates held up. Overall, whaling profit rates  seem to have 
been somewhat higher than returns in other comparable industries, presumably 
because business risks were higher among the whalers. 
Profit rates varied with productivity and the state of the market. Agents who 
stayed in the business for extended periods almost always did well, of course, 
in the sense that they paid all costs, including implicit interest on the invest- 
ment of the owners and generous fees to themselves, and also turned a profit. 
There were wide differences in the average rates of return earned by the various 
agent firms, even if comparisons are drawn exclusively among firms that were 
30. Lee Craig (1993, 82) has made estimates of the net profit rates in farming in census year 
1860. These rates are probably conceptually comparable to our variant A estimates. He reports 
average farm profit rates of  10.4 percent in the Northeast and 9.7 percent in the Midwest. These 
figures are substantially higher than our variant A rate for 1860 (see table 11.2), but lower than 
our average for the full period. 
31. The bias, if  there is any, arises from the fact that some managerial wages are probably 
included in manufacturing profits. Atack and Bateman (1990, 35, 38) believe that they have more 
than compensated for the presence of managerial wages in profits and that their estimates of profit 
rates are actually biased downward. 458  Chapter 11 
in the business for many years. Presumably these differences reflect rents to 
special knowledge and rewards for innovative activity. 
Knightian normal profits seem to have run no more than 5.0 to 7.0 percent 
per year, and excess profits, no more than 3.7 to 5.7 percent, while returns to 
special knowledge, special skills, and innovative activity came to at least 3.0 
percent per year. 